Elections and Mass Politics in Yemen by Carapico, Sheila
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science
1993
Elections and Mass Politics in Yemen
Sheila Carapico
University of Richmond, scarapic@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/polisci-faculty-publications
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Near and Middle Eastern Studies
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carapico, Sheila. "Elections and Mass Politics in Yemen." Middle East Report 185 26, no. 6 (1993): 2-6.
'W ml 
Elections and Mass 
Politics in Yemen 
m's Presidential Council, May 25, 1990. From left to right: Salim Sallh, Vice 
President AH Salim al-Bayd, President All Abdallah Sallh, Abd al-Karlm al-Arashl and Abd 
ahAziz Abd al-Ghani. 
Yemen's experiment in popular parliamentary elec? 
tions has shaken things up in the Arabian Peninsula, 
the last place on earth that the United States wants to 
see democracy flourish. But internal political differ? 
ences, profound economic crisis and Saudi hostility 
puts this achievement at risk. 
The 
Yemeni parliamentary election of April 27, 1993, 
marks a watershed for the Arabian Peninsula. The 
multiparty contest for 301 constituency-based seats, and 
the period of unfettered public debate and discussion that 
preceded it, represents the advent of organized mass pol? 
itics in a region where political power has long remained 
a closely-held family affair. In the weeks after Yemenis 
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went to the polls, the regime next door in Saudi Arabia 
sent armed police to raid a university campus in Riyadh 
and arrest a professor active in a banned human rights 
committee. These and other developments in the region 
may compel the Clinton administration to weigh its democ? 
ratization rhetoric a little more seriously. When a high- 
ranking State Department official visited Yemen in mid- 
May, he followed his pro-forma congratulations with a 
cautionary note: "I don't think you should look on what you 
do here as a model for anyone else to follow."1 
Yemen's commitment to elections accompanied the uni? 
fication agreement between Ali Abdallah Salih, president 
of the (North) Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and Ali Salim 
al-Bayd, leader of the ruling party in the (South) People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Following for? 
mal unification on May 22,1990, a five-member Presidential 
Council headed by Salih held executive power, and the two 
former parliaments were combined in a unified Chamber 
of Deputies. Under a constitution approved by national 
referendum in May 1991, political parties organized open? 
ly and most restrictions on association, expression and 
movement were lifted. The 1991 referendum specified that 
the elections be held within 30 months of unification, but 
a combination of technical problems, procrastination and 
conflicts between "Ali and Ali" (Salih and al-Bayd) post? 
poned polling beyond the November 1992 deadline. 
In the months before April, a multiparty Supreme 
Elections Committee (SEC) drew up 301 districts and estab? 
lished procedures for voter and candidate registration, a 
10-day campaign period, write-in ballots, and counting 
procedures.2 In early 1993, 2.7 million adults (including 
77 percent of eligible males and 15 percent of eligible 
females) registered to vote. Some 4,800 candidates regis? 
tered, the majority of them independents.3 More than 3,600, 
including 50 women, stayed in the campaign until the end. 
Political Space 
How did it happen that two erstwhile dictators presided 
over relatively fair, peaceful multiparty elections? 
The answer lies mainly in the conditions that led to uni? 
fication. The end of the Cold War eliminated the Soviet 
assistance so essential to the PDRY's survival, and reduced 
Western and Gulf interests in sustaining inter-Yemeni 
tensions. Dissidents from each polity had sought refuge in 
the others' capital, and most independent political move? 
ments, organizations and unions were committed to unity. 
Planners looked to recent oil discoveries along their com? 
mon frontier to bring in foreign investment and exchange. 
In short, realizing that in order to maintain power they 
would have to share power, Ali and Ali agreed not only to 
merge their polities but to open up the process to wider 
participation.4 
The process had some unique facilitating features. 
Unlike other "democratizing" systems, Yemen inherited 
two ruling parties that shared power in a delicate, often 
tense balance during the transitional period, each retain? 
ing control of its former military and security apparatus- 
es. The General People's Congress (GPC) was founded by 
Ali Abdallah Salih in the 1980s as an Egyptian-style amal? 
gam of all political tendencies within Salih's regime. Ali 
Salim al-Bayd's Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), born during 
South Yemen's anti-colonial struggle and divided between 
old-guard Leninists and a growing number of social democ? 
rats, was better organized and had a more coherent ide? 
ology than the GPC. 
This rough two-party equilibrium created space for other 
political organizations. The Saudi-backed Isiah (Reform) 
Party is a marriage of convenience between Shaikh 
Abdallah al-Ahmar, the head of the powerful Hashid con? 
federation, and the urban-based Muslim Brotherhood. 
In 1991, the Isiah had led an unsuccessful boycott of the 
1991 constitutional referendum because the shari'a is stip? 
ulated simply as "the main" rather than "the only" source 
of legislation. The Iraqi-leaning Yemeni Ba'th is much 
smaller in numbers, but also wields some influence in trib? 
al and military circles through its charismatic leader, 
Mujahid Abu Shuarib.5 The most important among some 
40 other parties are three Nasirist factions; a sayyid* group 
known as al-Haq (Right); Omar al-Jawi's progressive 
Unionist Party; and the League of the Sons of Yemen led 
by Abd al-Rahman al-Jifri. Some smaller parties, unable 
to field a full slate and obtain state campaign financing, 
ran candidates as "independents." 
Despite instances of disorder and violence, and scores 
of complaints, the outcome indicated a genuine contest. 
The GPC won 123 constituencies; Isiah came in second 
with 62 seats, mostly from its tribal rather than its Islamist 
wing; the YSP took 57, mostly in the former PDRY; inde? 
pendents won 47; the Ba'th seven; three Nasirist parties 
each gained one seat; al-Haq won two, and one district's 
election was postponed.6 The YSP claimed that in addition 
to 57 party members, 13 independent socialists won with 
its support, and an additional 17 genuinely independent 
deputies-elect share its vision of the future.7 Some spec? 
ulated that Isiah, which declined to estimate its unofficial 
sympathizers, had 30 supporters who won under the GPC 
banner, plus three independents. By any count, the arith? 
metic mandated a coalition government.8 
Domestic Pressures 
Arab leaders have promised free elections in the past and 
not delivered. What made Salih and al-Bayd?neither of 
whose personal histories indicates a commitment to polit? 
ical liberalism?follow through? The answer lies in soci? 
etal pressures which took different forms: mass confer? 
ences, strikes, demonstrations, political organizations, 
press commentaries, academic symposia and maqiyal or 
"salons." 
Prior to the elections, a series of mass conferences pro? 
vided outlets for articulate opposition elements. A nine- 
day Talahum (Cohesion) Conference in December 1991, 
gathered some 10,000 men; although its banner was the 
* Sayyid (plural sadah) refers to persons claiming descent from Muhammad, the prophet, 
who comprised a ruling aristocracy in North Yemen prior to the 1962 revolution. 
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Bakil tribal confederation, urban intellectuals were among 
the organizers and authors of a 33-point resolution calling 
for judicial independence, strengthening of representative 
parliamentary and local bodies, fiscal restraint and man? 
agement, revitalization of agricultural and services.coop- 
eratives, an independent media, environmental protec? 
tion, free elections within the mandated time-frame, 
peaceful resolution of tribal conflicts, and other reforms.9 
Some seven other tribe-based but civic-oriented mass con? 
ferences in 1992 each issued written demands for the 
rule of law, pluralism, economic development and local 
autonomy. The Saba' (Sheba) Conference of Bakil and 
Madhaj tribes elected a council of trustees, a council of 
social reform, and follow-up committees to ensure insti? 
tutional continuity. 
This activity culminated with a national conference of 
representatives of the smaller center and left parties and 
political organizations, led by Omar al-Jawi. This time, 
the two ruling parties strove to delay, discourage, coopt 
and eventually offset what promised to be a major event 
by holding a simultaneous counter-conference and by 
arranging the ouster of their opponents from the San'a 
Cultural Center to the local Sheraton. Well-publicized in 
the opposition press but ignored by the official media, 
the center-left conference criticized delayed preparations 
for the elections and the government's reckless printing of 
money, and proposed a code of political conduct for polit? 
ical parties.10 The Ta'iz Conference in November 1992, 
headed by al-Jifri, went even further in attracting facul? 
ty, journalists and professionals; challenging Ta'iz's gov? 
ernor; constituting steering and work councils; and artic? 
ulating explicit demands for civic and human rights, local 
elections, and improved local services.11 Not to be outdone, 
the Isiah organized a 4,000-strong Unity and Peace 
Conference in December under the slogan "The Quran and 
the Sunna Supersede the Constitution and the Law."12 
These conferences, both tribal and urban-based, involv? 
ing tens of thousands of people, were among the transition 
period's most important political developments. In response, 
the regime felt compelled to adopt its own code of politi? 
cal conduct, dismiss the Ta'iz governor, accept the princi? 
ple of local elections, and adopt a rhetoric of electoral rights. 
There were also several outbursts of popular frustra? 
tion, most notably in December 1992. Outrage with the 
collapse of the value of the riyal, inadequate services, mount? 
ing unemployment, government corruption and post? 
ponement of the elections erupted in mass demonstrations 
against both the state and private merchants in all major 
cities. Along with strikes and threatened strikes by groups 
ranging from garbage collectors to judges, the near-riots 
reminded the government of the power of popular wrath. 
On a smaller scale but a more institutionalized basis, 
numerous independent political organizations emerged. 
The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and 
Liberties, established by liberal university professors, ini? 
tiated the National Committee for Free Elections (NCFE), 
in turn spurring the formation of other electoral NGOs. 
Although they failed on their own terms to guarantee the 
integrity of the balloting process, they did perform a mod? 
est watchdog function and met again after the elections to 
prepare for the next round. Syndicates, charities and inter? 
est groups have been increasingly active. 
The press is also significant within the political arena. 
More than 100 partisan and independent newspapers and 
magazines, mostly founded since 1990, covered these 
events. Although the government daily, Al-Thawra, and 
state-run television and radio tend to dominate news cov? 
erage, a number of opposition weeklies have a strong read? 
ership among the literate, urban, politically active popu? 
lation: Sawt al-(Ummal (Voice of the Workers), based in 
Aden, has the largest circulation of any paper. Party organs, 
includingRaay, Al-Tashih, Al-Sahwa and others, provide 
critical commentary and information about opposition con? 
ferences and independent organizations. There has emerged 
a press corps of scores of men and several dozen women 
who more and more approximate a fourth estate, conducting 
interviews, attending parliament, asking critical questions 
at press conferences, testing the limits of press law and 
defending one another against lawsuits.13 
Related to the mass conferences, political organizing 
and press activity was a trend toward academic symposia 
on topics such as the constitutional amendments, admin? 
istrative decentralization, municipal services, and the cam? 
paign experience of women candidates. Typically invit? 
ing members of each party and independent specialists, 
such symposia, virtually unheard of in the old North or 
South Yemen, provided fora for discussion, debate and 
refinement of ideas which were then reported in the oppo? 
sition press. 
More frequent and informal is an updated variation 
on the male qat session, or maqiyal, which approximates 
the "salons" of 19th-century Europe.14 Nowadays these 
customarily informal social gatherings may elect a chair, 
select a topic, establish rules of order, and hold organized 
political discussion on topics ranging from relations with 
the Gulf to women's rights to exchange rate policy. 
Collectively, these civic activities applied consider? 
able pressure on the regime to fulfill its promises, abide by 
a code of conduct, address its critics and respect political 
pluralism. Several Yemeni intellectuals have criticized 
international observers and reporters for presenting an 
unduly positive picture of the electoral experience, and 
many participants in the conferences and seminars are 
quite cynical about their own influence, insisting that they 
have been marginalized from the political process. By 
the same token, it is difficult to imagine the events of the 
past year taking place had they been passive. 
External Involvement 
Rumors in San'a had the US playing a major if covert 
role in organizing the elections and the post-electoral com? 
promise. There is scant evidence, though, of Western pres? 
sure for political liberalization in Arabia. Although US- 
Yemeni relations seemed poised to improve immediately 
after unification in May 1990, they deteriorated after Iraq's 
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invasion of Kuwait because, in the words of US Ambassador 
Arthur Hughes, "San'a wanted to maintain normal rela? 
tions with Baghdad."15 American aid, never monetarily 
significant, was slashed from $30 million to $3 million, and 
Agency for International Development (AID) direct-hire 
staff reduced from 19 to four or five. 
Unity and electoral democracy have never been high 
on the US agenda for the Arabian Peninsula. Washington 
habitually defers to Saudi perceptions. James Schelsinger, 
former CIA director and secretary of defense and a man 
with some experience in setting the US strategic agenda in 
the Middle East, asked recently "whether we seriously desire 
or prescribe democracy as the proper form of government 
for other societies. Perhaps the issue is most clearly posed 
in the Islamic world. Do we seriously want to change the 
institutions of Saudi Arabia? The brief answer is no...."16 
Once elections were scheduled, though, Washington felt 
obliged to make a show of support. An embassy memo? 
randum in April 1993 claimed that "We have shaped near? 
ly every program to strengthen Yemen's emerging demo? 
cratic institutions and to underline US support for this 
development...."17 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
David Mack arrived in early May to say that he was 
"instructed to congratulate the Yemeni people and gov? 
ernment."18 
Accordingly, with $480,000 (mostly for American staff 
and their travel expenses), AID funded the International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), and 
the International Republican Institute (IRI) to assist elec? 
tion officials and observers.19 Hastily arranged, these pro? 
jects had minimal effect. IFES was still conducting train? 
ing on the eve of the elections, using a syllabus their own 
team leader considered inadequate. IRI's team of inter? 
national observers included few Arabic speakers. Even the 
US Republicans could not overcome neighboring Arab 
states' reluctance to have their citizens observe the process. 
The IRI team included one person from the United Arab 
Emirates and a Bahraini who arrived on a tourist visa. 
NDI's plan to organize volunteer Yemeni monitors for each 
of the 7,000 polling stations was a fiasco, and illustrated 
the NDI's lack of familiarity with an Arab environment.20 
US press coverage was favorable, as were the reports 
of these US and international observer groups. But 
Washington's reaction was qualified by an obvious concern 
that pluralism not spread to other parts of the Peninsula. 
The State Department's Mack emphasized that "one elec? 
tion does not make a democracy" and that US support is 
more likely to consist of corporate investments than restored 
levels of aid. While holding that Yemen would have to take 
further steps toward democracy before satisfying US stan? 
dards, and agreeing that countries have the right to choose 
the style of democracy that best suits their internal envi? 
ronments, Mack then cited Kuwait's more controlled, lim? 
ited-participation poll last August as a precedent for 
Yemen!21 
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US and Gulf pressures may have been a factor in 
Yemen's appointment of a new foreign minister, 
Muhammad Salim Basindwa, who publicly disavowed 
Yemen's Gulf war stance and spent much of his time away 
from the fray courting a rapprochement with the Gulf 
monarchies.22 Ambassador Hughes announced a modest 
$1.7 million increase in US assistance, but made it clear 
that improved Yemeni relations with the Gulf are more 
important to Washington than civil rights and political 
pluralism.23 
Post-Election Developments 
In the new parliament's first session, Shaikh Abdallah al- 
Ahmar, the Isiah leader, won the speakership with 223 
votes. Balloting for three deputy speakers returned one 
each from GPC, Ba'th and YSP. A package of constitutional 
amendments put immediately to the Chamber proposed 
replacing the existing five-man Presidential Council, tech? 
nically selected by the Chamber, with a US-style two-term 
president and vice president; creating an upper house (a 
Consultative Council) with equal representation for each 
governorate; and mandating elections for the local coun? 
cils, district administrators and governors.24 An Islah-pro- 
posed amendment would require that all Yemeni laws 
conform to shari'a. 
Pending discussion of these amendments, parliament 
extended the term of the transition Presidential Council, 
with three Congress members and two Socialists, through 
October. Prime Minister Abu Bakr al-Attas of the YSP, 
asked to form the new government, appointed 15 minis? 
ters from the GPC, eight Socialists, six from Isiah, and Abu 
Shuarib of the Ba'th.25 Only a third of these 30 ministers 
were new. 
A general eight-point government program, whose most 
sensitive proposal concerned the long-delayed merger of 
the two armies, was put to parliament for a vote of confi? 
dence in early July.26 But just when bargaining and com? 
promises seemed to produce a workable coalition, the 
deputies balked. For more than a week in late July and 
early August, al-Ahmar pounded his gavel in a vain attempt 
to restore order as a raucous debate raged over the pro? 
gram, the constitutional amendments, the composition 
of the Presidential Council, and unification of the armed 
forces. After an alternative program drafted by parlia? 
mentary committee was presented, 260 deputies demand? 
ed to address the floor, threatening to drag on the debate 
endlessly. Finally a vote of confidence on the program 
passed on the implicit premise that the substance of the 
debate would be deferred to deliberations on the consti? 
tutional amendments package. As the Chamber went into 
recess in early August, the Isiah and the Socialists were 
each threatening to withdraw from the coalition unless 
their respective demands for shari'a law and the vice pres? 
idency were met. 
When parliament reconvened in September, a three- 
party committee was formed to discuss the proposed con? 
stitutional amendments, now revised to concentrate more 
power in the hands of the chief executive. Critics, includ? 
ing the newly-formed opposition coalition of five small par? 
ties, many Socialists, and independent intellectuals, con? 
tended that the current constitution has not yet been 
implemented, and that the continuing focus on the com? 
position of government institutions only served to divert 
attention away from a deepening economic crisis which 
promises to grow more acute as a World Bank-IMF struc? 
tural adjustment program is put into effect. Popular rat? 
ification of the political establishment has not diminished 
profound disagreements over basic issues of governance 
and accountability, and more than a few thoughtful 
Yemenis fear that even the startling accomplishments of 
the last several years?unification and participatory pol? 
itics?remain vulnerable to hostile forces in the country 
and in the region. ? 
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